Using a latent variable approach, the authors examined whether retesting on a cognitive ability measure resulted in measurement and predictive bias. A sample of 941 candidates completed a cognitive ability test in a high-stakes context. Results of both the within-group between-occasions comparison and the between-groups within-occasion comparison indicated that no measurement bias existed during the initial testing but that retesting induced both measurement and predictive bias. Specifically, the results suggest that the factor underlying the retest scores was less saturated with g and more associated with memory than the latent factor underlying initial test scores and that these changes eliminated the test's criterionrelated validity. This study's implications for retesting theory, practice, and research are discussed.
The assessment of general cognitive ability (i.e., g) is common in both educational and employment settings because of its robust power to predict important, real-world criteria and the relatively low costs associated with administration (Jensen, 1998; Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) . Given the high-stakes nature of such assessments, most professional testing guidelines state that test takers should be provided with a reasonable opportunity to retake the assessment (e.g., American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999; U.S. Department of Labor, 1978) . Typically such recommendations are based, appropriately, on the rationale that any single assessment is subject to a variety of measurement errors, some of which may lead to an underestimation of ability. Consistent with such recommendations, retesting opportunities are a common part of selection and promotion systems in large private (Muchinsky, 2004) and public sector organizations (Wheeler, 2004) . Likewise, students may retake graduate-level entrance tests, such as the Graduate Record Examination and Graduate Management Admission Test, up to five times in a year (Wheeler, 2004) .
Although retesting opportunities appear to be somewhat common and routinely recommended by professional guidelines, a comprehensive understanding of the nature of retest effects is lacking, and the psychometric "costs" of retesting are currently unknown. That is, although research on practice and coaching generally shows evidence for observed score changes (e.g., Briggs, 2001; Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & Gerrard, 2007; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993) , measurement, educational, and personnel scholars have only recently begun to directly investigate the impact of repeated testing on the constructrelated (e.g., Reeve & Lam, 2005) and criterion-related validity of cognitive ability tests (e.g., Hausknecht, Trevor, & Farr, 2002; Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005) . Moreover, there are multiple perspectives on the nature of retest effects, with some researchers arguing that retesting may enhance construct and predictive validity (e.g., Anastasi, 1981) , whereas others have argued that retesting may degrade construct-and criterion-related validity (e.g., Lubinski, 2000) . Thus, despite the pivotal role of measurement as the foundation for organizational sciences (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) , whether retaking an ability test influences its measurement properties, the meaning of test scores, and the generalizability of test scores is not well understood.
Understanding the effects of retesting should be of concern to personnel researchers and practitioners, given that the comparisons of scores across individuals or groups require assumptions of invariant measurement operations; that is, the fair use of test scores requires that the tests do not suffer from test bias. As Vandenberg and Lance (2000) noted, if the relations between the manifest indicators and the latent constructs differ from one observation to the next, comparing scores "may be tantamount to comparing apples and spark plugs" (p. 9). As such, the purpose of the current study is to address the psychometric implications of retaking a cognitive ability test in a selection context. Specifically, we examine the question of measurement bias by testing the assumption of measurement invariance within groups across occasions (i.e., comparison of the first and second administrations of the same test to the same group of individuals) and between groups within occasions (i.e., comparison of one-time test takers who differ in whether they will retake the test). Second, we investigate the question of predictive bias by comparing the predictive validity of factor scores within groups (i.e., validity of scores derived from first and second administrations of the same test) and between groups (i.e., validity of scores from a group of one-time test takers in comparison with scores from a group of two-time test takers derived from the same administration of a test).
To examine these issues, our study is situated in an actual high-stakes selection context. Therefore, our study deals with retest effects as they occur in such high-stakes contexts. This actual selection context differs from the lab context of test-retest reliability research, wherein all members of a representative sample of test takers retake the test after some interval. In a high-stakes selection context, only the test takers who fail the first time are strongly motivated to perform better on the retest (Hausknecht et al., 2002) . Logically, these test takers also performed worse on the first administration.
Psychometric Bias
Psychometric bias is a statistical concept that refers to the systematic over-or underestimation of true scores in a population (Jensen, 1980) . In particular, two forms of psychometric bias can be identified that are relevant to the question of how retesting impacts scores on tests-namely, measurement bias and predictive bias. In this section, we discuss each of the two forms of psychometric bias and the statistical procedures used to detect each.
Measurement Bias
Measurement bias occurs when the relationship between the construct and the observed scores differs across two or more groups. For example, a test would be said to suffer from measurement bias if observed scores reflected general reasoning ability for one group but acquired knowledge for another group (i.e., the test items measured different constructs as a function of group membership). Likewise, measurement bias would also be evidenced if a set of scores were reliable for one group of test takers but not for another (i.e., measured the same construct to different degrees). Generally speaking, measurement bias can be said to occur if the test differentially denotes the target construct across different groups or if the nature of the construct assessed by the test differs across the groups (McArdle, 1998) .
Measurement bias can be conceptualized as a set of questions regarding the equivalence (or invariance) of different parameters of a measurement model. Measurement invariance (MI) analyses are accomplished through specification of a series of increasingly restrictive factor models. Generally speaking, there are four tests of MI (or what Little, 1997 , referred to as Category 1 analyses) and two additional tests to assess construct-level invariance (or what Little referred to as Category 2 analyses). Only the Category 1 tests pertain to the question of measurement bias per se. It is important to note that each of these four tests assesses a different aspect of measurement bias, each of which has different implications regarding test use.
First, one tests configural invariance by specifying that the factor structure holds across groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) -that is, that the set of indicators reflects the same number of constructs and that each indicator relates to the same factors across groups (i.e., that the factor loading pattern is equivalent). Conceptually, this test assesses whether the set of manifest indicators reflects the same constructs across groups (of course, a complete test of construct validity requires much more evidence). Second, one effects a test of metric invariance by constraining the factor loadings of like indicators to be equal between groups (i.e., ⌳ A ϭ ⌳ B ), in addition to retaining all constraints for configural invariance. As argued by Vandenberg and Lance (2000) , testing for metric invariance is more stringent than testing for configural invariance in that it requires both the (unstandardized) factor loadings and the factor loading pattern to be equal between both groups. As such, this test assesses whether the same factor accounts for the same amount of variance in each of its manifest indicators across groups. Next, scalar invariance verifies that the indicators' intercepts are equal across the groups. This test determines whether the items are of equal difficulty across groups.
Finally, indicator uniquenesses are tested for invariance (i.e., the ␦ jk s are equal across groups). This test constrains the variance of like indicator error terms to be equal across groups. Some have interpreted this last test as a test of whether the items are equally reliable across groups; however, it should be noted that an item's uniqueness term carries variance due to "random error" variance as well as systematic variance not shared with other indicators in that particular analysis (Crocker & Algina, 1986, p. 295; Cole & Maxwell, 1985; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) . Thus, although changes in item reliability would result in noninvariance, a finding of noninvariance does not necessarily imply differences in item reliability (see Raykov, 2004 , for a latent variable approach to directly estimating internal consistency).
The failure of any one of these tests of invariance can be taken as evidence of some form of measurement bias. However, the type of bias implied differs. For example, metric bias implies that the relationship between the manifest indicators and the latent factor changes across groups; that is, the set of test items does not reflect the construct to the same degree across groups. Conversely, scalar bias suggests only that the items are of unequal difficulty across groups; it does not suggest that the test measures different factors across groups, nor that the items measure the same factors to different degrees. Thus, these different aspects of measurement bias have different implications for test use and interpretation.
Predictive Bias
Predictive bias is evidenced when different predictive validity coefficients (or regression equations, when a differential prediction framework is used) are observed for groups that differ on a specific characteristic or trait. Said differently, predictive bias is essentially an issue of whether the relationship between a predictor variable and a criterion variable is moderated by a third variable-for example, sex or age. In the case of retesting, predictive bias would be evidenced by significantly different validity coefficients for retest scores as compared to coefficients based on initial test scores. That is, the moderator variable of interest is occasion (i.e., initial test vs. retest).
Tests for predictive bias can be conducted at either the observed variable or the latent variable level of analysis. At the observed level, observed test scores are correlated with the criterion for each group separately, and the difference between the validity coefficients is statistically tested. Of course, for this test to be meaningful, the equivalency of measurement operations across groups (i.e., MI) must first be established. Alternatively, one may ask whether differences on the latent variables underlying observed scores are differentially related to a criterion. In this case, one would test for equivalence of the covariance term between the latent predictor variable and a criterion variable (either latent or observed). The advantage of the latter type of analysis is that the covariance between the substantive predictor construct and the criterion can be assessed directly (i.e., variance due to other sources is not included in the predictor variable).
Three Explanations of Retest Effects and Their
Implications for Psychometric Bias
Retest effects can be defined as test score changes after prior exposure to an identical test or alternate form of the test under standardized conditions (Lievens et al., 2005) . Substantial research has demonstrated the short-term effectiveness of practice and coaching for inducing mean increases in observed scores (e.g., Briggs, 2001; Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, & Kulik, 1984; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993) . Although there is variation in the size of retest effects across different tests and across people, retest effects appear to be significant and robust. For example, a meta-analysis by showed average increases of d ϭ .42 for same-test retest effects and d ϭ .23 for parallel tests. A recent meta-analysis of Hausknecht et al. (2007) confirmed these findings (d ϭ .26). Similarly, Salthouse, Schroeder, and Ferrer (2004) report 3-year test-retest score gains on various ability tests ranging from .20 to .41 standard deviation units.
Although a number of specific explanations for retest effects can be found in the literature (Lievens et al., 2005; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981; Sackett, Burris, & Ryan, 1989) , they generally take on one of three forms: (a) construct-relevant changes (i.e., an actual increase in the target ability), (b) a reduction in debilitating construct-irrelevant factors, and (c) increases in non-g test-specific skills. We discuss each in turn below. The implications of each of these three explanations with respect to psychometric bias are summarized in Figure 1 .
Explanation 1 argues that changes in scores reflect an actual change in the underlying ability construct measured by the test. To explain retest effects, then, one could posit that individuals learn and profit from the testing experience itself, and thus their actual ability levels increase, on average, across repeated testing sessions. For example, the act of completing a test of physical fitness could enhance one's actual level of physical fitness. Explanation 1 is consistent with the so-called testing effect, which has been studied extensively in the cognitive and educational testing literatures. The testing effect refers to the robust finding that the act of taking a memory-based test not only assesses what people know but also leads to later long-term retention of the material assessed (see Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) . The testing effect is well documented, as it was found for a variety of tests (free-recall tests, multiple-choice tests, etc.) and for memorization of a diversity of material (word lists, picture lists, textbooks, lectures, etc.). According to Roediger and Karpicke (2006) , overlearning (i.e., the test provides additional exposure to the material memorized), effortful retrieval (i.e., the test leads to elaboration of the material), and transfer-appropriate processing (i.e., the test requires the same type of processing of the material as the operations engaged during learning) provide theoretical explanations for the testing effect.
This perspective posits that score gains reflect real changes in the underlying construct that are accurately assessed by the test. Accordingly, there should not be measurement bias or predictive bias, because retest scores reflect the same underlying construct to the same degree as do initial test scores. Both initial and retest scores reflect individual differences in the target ability equally well and thus should not induce measurement or predictive bias.
While this explanation might be a viable possibility for assessments whose variance is primarily attributable to physical skills, acquired cognitive skills, declarative knowledge, or memory tests (see the body of research on the testing effect), it seems rather unlikely for manifest indicators that load highly on the g factor (i.e., tests, items, or scales that are highly "g loaded"). That is, it is unlikely that g is so malleable as to be enhanced by simple practice (Messick & Jungeblut, 1981) , especially given that intensive long-term intervention programs do not appear to have any lasting effects on measured intelligence (Jensen, 1998; Spitz, 
Figure 1. Summary of predictions regarding measurement and predictive bias stemming from the three explanations for retest effects. Group A1 reflects initial test scores of those who took the test twice. Group A2 reflects the retest scores of those who took the test twice. Thus, Group A1 and A2 reflect the same people but different sets of scores. Group B reflects the test scores of one-time test takers (all of whom took the test at the first session along with Group A1). An equals sign means that measurement invariance is posited, whereas a not equal sign means that measurement noninvariance is posited.
1986). Therefore, we believe that observed score increases associated with retest effects on highly g-loaded assessments (e.g., general cognitive ability tests) likely reflect something other than a true change in the underlying target construct. Explanation 2 suggests that retesting leads to a reduction of debilitating, construct-irrelevant influences that are present (or at least more salient) during the initial testing session. For example, Anastasi (1981) posited a test sophistication hypothesis, suggesting that brief practice (e.g., an example set of items) may increase the construct validity of ability tests by reducing confusion and test anxiety. Similarly, retesting may evoke score gains to the extent that the initial test functions, in essence, as a set of practice items. Accordingly, this perspective posits that the relation between the test items and the latent factors would be altered by retesting. For example, if confusion and unfamiliarity were suppressing scores during initial testing, we would expect the items on the initial test to be less reliable and show lower factor loadings compared to items in the retest condition. In the extreme case, the number of factors reflected by the items and the factor loading pattern could be altered. In terms of a between-persons comparison, it could be posited that the scores for those who did poorly on the initial test (and thus eventually went on to retest) were suppressed by confusion and unfamiliarity, whereas those who did well the first time did not suffer from such debilitating influences. Thus, we would expect to see lower reliabilities and factor loadings for the (lower scoring) group who eventually retested, compared to the (higher scoring) group who did not go on to retest. Likewise, if this argument has merit, we would expect the retest scores to yield a higher predictive validity for g-loaded criteria (i.e., criterion measures that would load heavily on the g factor if included in a factor analysis of ability scales) than the initial test scores, as the retest scores are less influenced by construct-irrelevant factors and are presumably better measures of g. Similarly, by extension to the between-persons comparison, we would expect to see higher predictive validities for the scores from the group who did not go on to retest than for the initial scores from the group who did go on to retest. Explanation 3 stems from Lubinski's (2000) suggestion that practice builds up "nonerror uniqueness" components of ability tests-factors such as method-specific knowledge 1 (aka, testwiseness), specific item content knowledge, or narrow skills unique to the item content (e.g., memorization of numbers). That is, in terms of Carroll's (1993) three-stratum model of abilities, Explanation 3 posits that practice due to retesting increases the test-specific skills residing in the lowest level of the hierarchy of cognitive abilities (Jensen, 1998, chapter 10; Te Nijenhuis, van Vianen, & van der Flier, 2007) . Supporters of this argument contend that the non-g components underlying observed test scores account for an increasing share of the variance across repeated administrations, and, hence, the predictive validity of observed test scores decreases (because the generalizability of test scores resides predominantly in g). If this argument is true, we would expect to observe evidence of measurement bias as well as predictive bias across repeated administrations of the test. Specifically, this perspective suggests that initial test scores should be the better measure of g, whereas the retest scores reflect proportionally more variance due to non-g factors. As a result, the relations between test items and the general factor should be altered, and the predictive validity of retest scores (which are less g loaded) should be reduced compared to the initial test scores.
In summary, there are three basic explanations for retest effects, each of which predicts a specific pattern of results concerning measurement and predictive bias. These patterns are summarized in Figure 1 . Explanation 1 hypothesizes that retesting induces a true change in general cognitive ability and thus predicts no measurement or predictive bias. Explanation 2 hypothesizes that retest effects occur because the initial testing session essentially acts like an extended instruction set; therefore, retest scores should be less contaminated (i.e., more g loaded) than initial test scores and display higher predictive validity. Thus, Explanation 2 predicts that one should observe evidence of measurement and predictive bias when making across-occasion comparisons, with the retest scores showing stronger external associations with g-loaded measures. Explanation 3 hypothesizes that retesting increases the test-specific, non-g components of the test. This explanation implies that initial test scores are free from measurement bias and that retesting induces measurement (and, consequently, predictive) bias. Therefore, Explanation 3 also predicts evidence of acrossoccasion measurement and predictive bias, but in this case the initial test scores should show stronger external associations with g-loaded measures than the retest scores.
Present Study
A critical concern with retesting in applied settings is the possibility that retesting can result in test bias. As such, the current study is designed to specifically address two primary questions: (a) To what degree does retesting alter the measurement properties of a cognitive ability test, and (b) to what degree does retesting alter the pattern of external correlates of test scores? To answer these questions, the current study applies latent variable MI analyses and predictive bias analyses to data derived from a cognitive ability test included in a high-stakes testing setting (medical school admissions testing). The results of these within-and between-groups analyses are then compared to the three hypothesized patterns of results explained above and summarized in Figure 1 .
Method

Sample and Procedure
The total sample consisted of 941 candidates (359 men and 582 women) who attended the Medical and Dental Studies admission exam in the Flemish part of Belgium. The average age of the candidates was 19 years 7 months (SD ϭ 1.8 years). This admission exam was organized by the government (there was no further selection on the part of the universities) and was administered in a large hall. A week after the exam, candidates obtained feedback on their test scores. Candidates who did not pass could retake the test battery. Two examinations were scheduled per year (at the start of July and at the end of August). All 941 candidates in the July session were first-time test takers. Of these, 178 subsequently repeated the test in the August session (hereafter referred to as Group A), whereas 763 did not repeat the test in the August session (hereafter referred to as Group B). The data sets for the group of repeat test takers are referred to as Group A1 and A2, where the number indicates data based on the participants' first attempt or second attempt, respectively. Criterion data were available for 94 individuals from Group A and 518 individuals from Group B. With this data set, we can make within-group across-occasion comparisons (i.e., Group A1 vs. Group A2) as well as a between-groups within-occasion comparison (first-time test takers who differed in whether they would retake the test; Group A1 vs. Group B). (Note that cross-cohort comparisons could be made as well-e.g., Group A2 could be compared to Group B-however, these tests are less informative, as they confound variance due to group differences as well as occasion-specific differences.)
Predictor Measures
The medical college admission exam consisted of a battery of four ability tests (a general cognitive ability test, a visual information-processing test, a memory association test, and a pattern recognition test), two miniaturized work samples (a videotaped lecture and a medical text), and two situational judgment tests (these dealt with patient-physician interaction and teamwork). For test security reasons, we cannot mention the source of the four cognitive ability tests. Interested researchers may contact us to obtain more information.
The main focus in this study is on the general cognitive ability test. Prior research documented the reliability (test-retest reliability ϭ .84) and predictive validity for grade point average (GPA; r ϭ .36) of this cognitive ability test in a medical student population (Lievens, 2004; Minnaert, 1996) . In this general cognitive ability test, three types of items were used, all designed to tap general inductive and deductive reasoning (i.e., g). There were 19 verbal items (e.g., verbal analogies), 19 numeric items (e.g., completing number series), and 16 symbolic reasoning items (e.g., symbolic analogies). Therefore, in both the July and the August sessions, the general cognitive ability test consisted of 54 items. However, in light of test security concerns, only 6 items of each item type (18 in total) were administered on both testing occasions. These 18 items were exactly the same across testing occasions. Hence, this set of 18 items from the general mental ability test is analyzed in the current study. Accordingly, we ensured that the test was held constant across administrations and that score changes could be ascribed solely to person-related changes. Although the surface features of the items reflect three categories, a prior factor analysis of the items confirmed that they all denote general reasoning ability (i.e., the eduction of relations and correlates, or g) and do not share content-specific variance that might reflect group factors. Thus, a single-factor model is used as the measurement model for this study. Descriptive statistics for the raw test scores (based on these 18 items) are shown in Table 1 .
In addition to this general cognitive ability test, three specific cognitive ability tests were used. The visual informationprocessing test (32 items) measured the ability to quickly scan and interpret complex figures. In the memory association test, characteristics of 15 patients (i.e., name, age, job title, type of illness) had to be memorized. The reproduction phase (which took place on completion of the general cognitive ability test) contained 20 questions dealing with these patient descriptions. Finally, the pattern recognition test measured the cognitive ability to determine which simple figure was part of a complex figure. In particular, 50 complex figures were included, and, per complex figure, 5 possible simple figures were presented. Note that these three specific cognitive ability tests are not used as part of the primary MI analyses, although we do use the scores from these other tests for additional analyses.
Criterion Measures
GPA in medical school served as a measure of academic performance. Participants' GPA from the first 3 years of study (known as the preclinical years) was obtained from university records. Classes and exams tend to be largely theoretical in nature (e.g., testing knowledge in the core science classes) during the first 3 years of studies. In Belgium, GPA is measured on a scale from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating better grades.
To circumvent potential distortion effects caused by differences in harsh or lenient grading policies between universities, we standardized individuals' GPAs within each of the six universities from which data were obtained. With respect to the reliability of this criterion, we were able to correlate the GPAs from each year; the average correlation was near .70. These values are similar to the values found in a meta-analysis on the temporal stability of GPA (Vey et al., 2003) . Descriptive statistics for the standardized GPA variable are shown in Table 1 .
Analyses
Structural equation modeling analyses were conducted with the AMOS software (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1996) through maximum- Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998) . A "spiraling" assignment method was used to create six item parcels containing one item of each of the three types of items mentioned above. Given that candidates were selected on the basis of a third variable (i.e., selected on the basis of a cutoff score determined on an operational composite, which was a weighted sum of the admission tests used), the raw variance-covariance matrices were corrected for indirect range restriction (Thorndike's, 1949 , Case 3). All structural equation modeling analyses reported are based on the corrected matrices. Vandenberg and Lance (2000) suggested that overall model fit should be assessed via a variety of indexes. Consistent with their recommendation, we used the chi-square statistic as well as the chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio, which ameliorates the chisquare index's sensitivity to sample size. We also used the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990 ) and the root-mean-square error of approximation (Steiger & Lind, 1980) . CFI values at or above .95 are generally considered indicative of good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999) , while .90 is often used as a lower bound for claiming adequate fit. For the root-mean-square error of approximation, values smaller than .05 are indicative of good fit, and values of .08 represent an upper bound for acceptable fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) . Although change in chi-square is often used to detect a significant reduction in model fit (i.e., to determine noninvariance), Cheung and Rensvold's (2002) simulation study showed this to be a poor index. Rather, on the basis of their analyses, Cheung and Rensvold suggested that the criterion of change in CFI greater than .01 is the most appropriate method to detect noninvariance.
Results
Results of Measurement Bias Analysis
Our first question was whether retesting induces measurement bias. Given our data, we were able to test for measurement bias within and between groups. We first conducted a between-groups test of MI using the data from the first session (i.e., Group A1 vs.
Group B)
. This analysis addresses the question of whether there was bias at initial testing acting to suppress the scores of the group of people who would eventually retest (largely because of their lower scores at Time 1).
The MI results for the between-groups within-occasion analyses are shown in Table 2 . The results show that all Category 1 MI assumptions were supported. In each case, the overall model fit indexes indicated a good fit to the data, and the change in indexes between each step of the Category 1 analyses suggested that the additional restrictions did not lead to a significant reduction in fit according to Cheung and Rensvold's (2002) criterion (i.e., change in CFI was never greater than .01). Thus, we conclude that metric invariance did hold, as well as all other Category 1 tests. Therefore, no measurement bias at Time 1 is indicated, which is consistent with Explanation 1 and Explanation 3 and inconsistent with Explanation 2 (as shown in Figure 1) .
The Category 2 MI analyses for the between-groups withinoccasion comparison are shown at the bottom of Table 2 . The results indicate that the assumption of factor variance equality was tenable. However, adding the structural restriction for invariant factor means resulted in a less than adequate overall fit and a significant decrement in model fit compared to the less restricted model (⌬CFI ϭ .16 ). This confirms that the group of eventual repeat test takers was of lesser average ability than the group of one-time test takers. Factor mean estimates based on the final well-fitting model (i.e., Model 5 in Table 3 ) were 1.74 for the eventual retest group (Group A1) and 2.14 for the one-time group (Group B). A possible criticism of these analyses is that Group B included some people who essentially failed the test (i.e., were not admitted to medical school) but did not retest. Because these people were arguably more like those in Group A1, this might have biased the results in favor of finding invariance. Thus, we redid these analyses using only those individuals from Group B who were actually admitted to medical school, thus eliminating those from Group B who failed the test but did not retest. The results of these MI analyses again confirm complete MI with respect to Group A1.
Second, we conducted a within-group between-occasions test of MI on the data from individuals who took the test on both occasions (i.e., Group A1 compared to Group A2). This analysis addresses the question of whether retaking the same test leads to a change in the measurement properties of the test. The MI results Note. CFI ϭ comparative fit index; RMSEA ϭ root-mean-square error of approximation; CI ϭ confidence interval.
for this analysis are shown in Table 3 . The results suggest that assumptions of metric and uniqueness invariance were not supported. For both of these tests, the changes in the CFI were greater than .01, which exceeds Cheung and Rensvold's (2002) criterion. Thus, these analyses do not support the assumption of MI across repeated administrations of the same test. Specifically, these results suggest that taking the test a second time altered the degree to which the indicators loaded on the general factor as well as the specific variance associated with each indicator. Because noninvariance was indicated, the Category 2 MI analyses are not directly interpretable; thus, we make no further comment on those Category 2 analyses. Generally, the results of our within-group between-occasions MI analyses are consistent with Explanation 2 and Explanation 3 and inconsistent with Explanation 1, as shown in Figure 1 . Across the two sets of analyses, only Explanation 3 conforms to the entire pattern of results.
Results of Predictive Bias Analysis
To conduct the predictive validity analyses, we added the GPA measure to the measurement model and allowed it to covary with the general factor extracted from the ability test indicators. Specifically, we did this set of analyses three times (once for each group). It should be noted that we did not conduct multigroup structural equation modeling analyses in this case; rather, we fitted the model to each group independently. The reason is that the sample size for Group A was substantially smaller than for the MI analyses, because only those individuals who actually entered medical school (and finished at least the first 3 years) were included. With such a limited sample size, any invariance analysis would be significantly underpowered. Differences between correlations were tested with the standard z test for differences between independent (i.e., Group A2 vs. Group B) and dependent groups (i.e., Group A1 vs. Group A2).
Results are shown in Table 4 . The most meaningful result is the within-group between-occasions comparison (Group A1 vs. Group A2). As shown, the predictive validity of retest scores was null, whereas the initial test scores showed a positive coefficient (r ϭ .19, though not statistically significant given the small sample size). These results indicate that retesting induced a (negative) predictive bias. This pattern of coefficients is especially telling given that it was the retest scores on which members of Group A were admitted to medical school, yet the validity resides in the initial test scores. In this respect, the comparison between Group B and Group A2 is also telling, as these are the test data on which individuals from both groups were actually selected for medical school. These results reveal that the general factor derived from the retested data (i.e., Group A2) did not predict GPA (r ϭ .00, ns), whereas the general factor derived from the group who did not retest (Group B) did predict GPA significantly (r ϭ .48, p Ͻ .01). However, this comparison should be interpreted cautiously given preexisting differences among Groups A2 and B. Taken as a whole, the pattern of results from the predictive bias analyses is most consistent with Explanation 3, as shown in Figure 1 .
Additional Analyses
Recall that Explanation 3 posits that practice builds up non-g, nonerror variance components of ability tests. To further test Explanation 3 and to better understand whether the g-factor scores derived from a repeated test are comparable to those based on initial test scores (i.e., amenable to the same substantive interpretations), we conducted three additional correlational analyses. The first two analyses drew on reference scores from the other parts of the full test battery that was administered during the first session (see the Method section). First, we correlated the latent factor with scores on a memory test that was included in the full ability battery. Second, we derived an independent g score based on the scale scores of the remainder of the cognitive battery. To obtain this score, we submitted data from the two other ability scales administered at Time 1 (the pattern recognition test and the visual inspection test) to a principalfactor analysis and retained the first unrotated principal factor. We Note. CFI ϭ comparative fit index; RMSEA ϭ root-mean-square error of approximation; CI ϭ confidence interval. refer to this new variable as GCA to distinguish it from the latent general factor derived from the target set of indicators.
The pattern of results shown in Table 5 is again most consistent with arguments reflected in Explanation 3. On the one hand, the correlation between the latent factor from our target set of indicators and the GCA variable was the highest for the group of one-time test takers (Group B) and the lowest for Group A2. On the other hand, the correlation with memory increased on readministration. That is, the correlation for the latent factor from the target cognitive ability test was essentially independent of memory on initial testing but became significantly correlated on retesting (the correlation for Group A2 was significantly larger than the correlations for Groups A1 and B, ps Ͻ .05). Further, the latent factor derived from retest scores was correlated more strongly with memory than it was with the GCA variable.
Finally, to further assess the degree to which the factor underlying variance in the retest scores was equivalent to the factor derived from the initial testing, we used Jensen's (1998) correlated vectors method. This method has been widely used to assess the degree to which the psychometric general factors assessed by different tests are substantively the same g factor (Jensen, 1998) . To do so, we submitted the data from the set of six target indicators to a principal-factor analysis and retained the first unrotated principal factor. We did this separately for Groups A1 and A2 and then correlated the two vectors of factor scores. Results showed that the two sets of factor scores were correlated (r ϭ .27), but to a rather modest degree. To place this correlation in context, we note that research examining the comparability of g scores obtained from different combinations of test batteries and different methods of factor analyses typically show correlations above .95 (Jensen, 1998) . This further suggests that the nature of the factor reflected by retest scores is not entirely the same as the one reflected by initial test scores.
Discussion
Given the prevalence of retesting in selection contexts, it is pivotal to better understand the nature of retest effects and their implications for the use of test scores. This study takes an important step in that direction by being the first to use a latent variable approach in examining possible measurement and predictive biases due to retaking a cognitive ability test in a high-stakes context. Specifically, we found evidence of measurement and predictive bias in retest scores; that is, we found metric and uniqueness noninvariance across repeated administrations of the test and evidence that retesting eliminated the predictive validity of test scores. These findings suggest that the scores based on the retest were, to some degree, reflecting something different than scores based on the initial assessment. Additionally, we found no evidence for measurement bias between lower and higher scoring groups on initial testing. It thus seems the test functioned the same across groups on initial testing, apparently assessing some ability factor that was generalizable enough to predict GPA. However, on retesting, the construct validity of the test was altered, and thus its criterion-related validity was compromised. Consistent with these findings, the additional correlational analyses indicate that the factor assessed by the cognitive ability test under investigation changed. For example, similar to the results of Reeve and Lam (2005) , who found that the variance due to memory increased reliably with each repeated administration of a test, the current results suggest that the test became less g loaded on retesting and became more associated with variance due to memory.
In addition to addressing a purely empirical question of whether retesting alters the psychometric properties of an ability test, the set of analyses conducted enabled us to test three possible explanations for retest effects. Taken as a whole, the pattern of results found in the current study is consistent with Explanation 3 and inconsistent with the other two explanations. Explanation 3 states that test score increases associated with retesting are likely due to the unique, nonability variance components of the tests (Lubinski, 2000) . Further, our results appear to be consistent with findings from the practice effects literature (e.g., Coyle, 2006; Reeve & Lam, 2007; Te Nijenhuis et al., 2007) demonstrating that score gains are "hollow with respect to g" (Jensen, 1998, p. 308) . That is, score gains on cognitive ability tests are not g loaded; rather than reflecting a generalizable ability component, they appear to reflect a narrow ability component (e.g., memory). Because narrow ability components such as memory are generalizable only with respect to very narrow criterion components (Reeve, 2004) , they typically fail to demonstrate criterion-related validity for important real-world criteria. Our results appear to confirm this notion, as the retest scores failed to demonstrate criterion-related validity.
Implications for Practice and Research
At a practical level, our results raise concerns about the psychometric impact of retesting on cognitive tests and call into question some of the arguments justifying retesting. One justification for retesting is that the initial test might have been biased because test takers were suffering from a so-called deficit (e.g., lack of familiarity with the test or test anxiety). Therefore, retesting should provide a more valid assessment of the candidates' standing on the constructs of interest. However, contrary to those propositions, this study found no evidence of any measurement bias against lower scoring groups in the initial testing situation and found that the initial scores, rather than the retest scores, yielded predictive validity. Taken together, these two results do not provide support for the operational use of scores from repeated cognitive ability tests when the same items are used in both administrations. Future research should test whether the same conclusions are valid for use of parallel (instead of identical) tests in retesting. We believe that our three general hypotheses for the changes in observed scores associated with retesting (see Figure 1) are also relevant for examining retest effects for tests other than cognitive ability. However, at the same time, we emphasize that our conclusion that Explanation 3 predominates is only valid for cognitive ability tests. Future research should test whether retest effects in achievement and knowledge tests and in nonability tests (e.g., personality tests) lead to conclusions similar to those that we reached on the basis of the current analyses. Regarding achievement and knowledge tests, we expect that Explanation 1 (testing actually increases standing on the construct of interest) might prevail. This expectation is based on the robust evidence in favor of the so-called testing effect in the cognitive and educational testing literatures (see above). It would also be interesting for future research to test the viability of our models in the personality domain. For instance, there is ample evidence that test takers' answers become more reliable when they retake a personality inventory. This finding might be explained either by bias being present in the first examination or by better self-presentation in the second administration (i.e., increased self-schema clarity; see Hamilton & Shuminsky, 1990; Knowles, 1988; Steinberg, 1994) . As our models (see Figure 1 ) are related to these explanations, they can be fruitfully applied to this domain. However, any retesting in the personality domain also needs to be concerned with changes in intentional distortion from the initial to the retest situation.
We caution that our results need to be replicated for other cognitive ability tests, in other samples, and in other settings before policy makers draw firm conclusions or form policies. Note, too, that our results were obtained for a specific cognitive ability test in a specific operational setting (educational context in Belgium). In addition, it is important to acknowledge a potential confound in this study. Although the specific set of items we examined was identical across occasions, the larger battery in which they were embedded changed. It is possible that the finding of between-occasions measurement bias could be attributed to this contextual difference. Although this is a concern, it cannot explain the entire pattern of results obtained across all the analyses (i.e., this would not explain the consistent pattern of decreases in correlations with g-loaded variables and the increase in the correlation with memory). Additionally, it should be noted that GPA served as our only work-oriented criterion, and we only had two other external correlates. Future research should continue to expand the nexus of external correlates, including g-loaded job performance criteria.
This study also offers important methodological contributions. First, we examined measurement and predictive bias due to retesting within a latent construct framework. Although the results of the observed score and latent construct approaches (cf. Table 1 and the other tables) point in the same direction, the advantages of the latent construct approach lies primarily in the quality of information provided. When researchers examine retest effects at the observed level, they basically have to guess what caused the effects, running the risk of misattributing the differences found. For example, as compared to the latent variable analyses, the inspection of mean score differences and validity differences in Table 1 does not provide any meaningful information about the reasons why retest effects occurred or why the predictive validity decreased. Instead, a latent construct approach allows for the explicit test of differences in measurement properties prior to comparison of initial and retest scores. By linking the MI tests to possible explanations of retest effects, researchers have a much more fine-grained approach for testing hypothesized causes behind retest effects. For example, in this study, evidence of metric and uniqueness bias across occasions enabled us to discount the first explanation for retest effects (see Figure 1) .
Second, this study demonstrates the complexity of retest effects. Retesting in this case appeared to alter the measurement properties of the set of indicators, apparently because of a change in the substantive nature of the variance assessed by those indicators. This finding suggests that a true understanding of retest effects requires not just a latent variable analysis but a latent variable analysis based on a wide set of various indicators to model g variance, non-g variance, and noncognitive variance. In the current study, the operational test was too brief to allow for the full assessment of a wide range of general and narrow abilities. By way of contrast, Reeve and Lam (2005) , who administered a more comprehensive battery and modeled the variance due to both general and narrow abilities, failed to find any evidence of measurement bias across three testing occasions. They did, however, find that the variance of the memory factor increased across occasions. It is possible that the discrepancy between the current study's findings and Reeve and Lam's results is a function of the number and type of ability factors modeled. Said differently, it is possible that retesting alters the meaning of observed scores (as shown in the current study) but that invariant estimates of g can be obtained if one can accurately model a broader range of narrow abilities. Clearly, our interpretation is only a supposition at this point, but the differences in these two studies may point the way for future research on retest effects. Moreover, we believe this exemplifies the need for the continuation of both lab-based and field-based research on retest effects.
Finally, we encourage researchers to consider other perspectives on retesting (e.g., the candidate's perspective). The current study only speaks to the psychometric implications of retesting. However, formulation of retesting policies should consider a broader set of outcomes. Personnel scholars have long noted the distinction between psychometric bias (a statistical concept) and fairness (a social concept). In addition to calling for more research on the psychometric implications of retesting, we note that there is virtually no research investigating fairness perceptions or other applicant reactions to the various aspects of retesting policies.
Conclusion
This study moves beyond documenting changes in mean observed scores on retesting and toward an understanding of the psychometric implications of these changes. By using a latent variable approach, we found that retesting induced both measurement and predictive bias. Specifically, our analyses suggest that retesting resulted in increases in the degree to which the test items assessed non-g test-specific skills (e.g., memory) and a decrease in the g loadings of the items. We hope that this study's methodology and results encourage researchers to further scrutinize possible causes behind retest effects and practitioners to critically consider the potential implications of retesting.
